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Abstract
The article analyses the organisation of the Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość [PiS]) in Poland. The case of PiS
does not only allow us to explore the organisational features of a strongly institutionalized, incumbent party which uses
populist radical right (PRR) politics. PiS, we argue, is also an ideal case to contrast what such parties might rhetorically
declare and substantively do about their organisational features. Using party documents, press reports, quantitative data,
and insights from the secondary literature based on interviewswith activists, we evaluate the extent towhich PiS has devel‐
oped a mass‐party‐related organisation, and centralized its intra‐party decision‐making procedures. We find that while PiS
made overtures to some aspects of mass‐party‐like organisation for electoral mobilization, the party remained reluctant
to actively expand its membership numbers and put little effort into fostering the integration and social rootedness of its
members through everyday intra‐party activities. Furthermore, despite attempts to enact organisational reinvigoration, in
practice PiS continued to revolve around strongly centralized structures and, in particular, the absolutist leadership style
of the party’s long‐time Chair Jarosław Kaczyński. The analysis contributes to assessing the variety and functions of organ‐
isational features and appeals within the comparative study of PRR parties. Most particularly, it invites further research
into the still relatively under‐researched interactions between PRR party organisation and active party communication.
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1. Introduction
The case of the Law and Justice party (Prawo i
Sprawiedliwość [PiS]) in Poland offers interesting insights
that can further contribute to our growing understanding
of the diversity across populist radical right (PRR) party
organisations (Albertazzi, 2016; Bolleyer, 2013; Heinisch
& Mazzoleni, 2016). Analysing the current Polish incum‐
bent does not only allow us to explore organisational
features of a strongly institutionalized, established party,
which over time has internalized core elements of PRR
politics. Additionally, the case of PiS, which flexibly oper‐
ated between radical and conventional politics, invites us
to account for and juxtapose what parties might rhetori‐
cally declare and substantively do regarding their organi‐
sational features.
Polish parties are generally characterized by par‐
ticularly weak membership bases, even in compari‐
son to other Central and Eastern European countries
(GUS, 2020; van Biezen et al., 2012). Concurrently, since
the onset of the democratic transition, Polish parties
focused more on efforts to promote their mediatized,
electoral “product” in coordination with specialist cam‐
paign agencies and political consultants rather than to
build strong party‐voter linkages, developing their cen‐
tral office organisations and internal power relations
accordingly (cf. Biskup, 2011; Mazur, 2011; Sula, 2008).
Hence, while in Western Europe parties have gradually
shifted from mass towards electoral‐professional organ‐
isations (Farrell & Webb, 2000; Panebianco, 1988), after
1989 Polish politics witnessed amuch swifter emergence
of instant electoral‐professional parties.
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In this context, we could thus expect even less
attempts from established parties—and particularly
those with office ambitions pursuing flexible vote‐
maximizing strategies—to develop mass‐party‐type
organisations, which we characterize here by efforts to
recruit a large number of active party members and to
foster their intra‐party social rootedness (cf. Albertazzi
& van Kessel, 2021). Yet parties may actively adapt to, or
try to defy, their operative contexts. Especially for parties
which fundamentally contest “politics as usual,” organisa‐
tional innovation and appeals to reinvigorate party‐voter
linkages might constitute an advantageous distinguish‐
ing trait in party competition (Barr, 2009). Indeed, Polish
anti‐establishment actors regularly combined their pri‐
mary ideological stances with invocations of dedicated
representation and efficacious governance, presenting
their organizations as viable to overcome merely short‐
term election‐oriented politics, negative campaigning,
and sociotechnical “PR spin.”
Yet rhetorical strategies may not necessarily reflect
substantive organisational practice. In 2015, the PiS elec‐
toral campaign simulated organisational processes of dis‐
persing power away from its long‐time Chair (prezes),
Jarosław Kaczyński. It also portrayed the “renewed”
organisation as capable of fundamentally “fixing” Polish
representative politics by closing gaps between par‐
ties and citizens (Engler et al., 2019; Pytlas, in press).
Nonetheless, in the Polish public debate, the party con‐
tinues to stand out as a prime example of a strongly
centralized, hierarchical party dominated by its Chair.
Accordingly, we argue that it is relevant to evaluate
party organisations by juxtaposing communicative decla‐
rations with the actual lived practices of political parties
in general, and PRR actors in particular.
Following the conceptual framework proposed by
Albertazzi and van Kessel (2021), in this article we focus
primarily on the extent to which PiS made substantive
efforts to develop amass‐party‐related organisation, and
to centralize its intra‐party decision‐making procedures.
At the same time, we approach this question specifically
by accounting for what parties using PRR politics might
rhetorically declare and substantively do about their
organisational features. To achieve these goals, we trian‐
gulate multiple data sources, including party documents,
press statements, quantitative data, and insights from
secondary literature based on interviews with activists.
We find that while PiS used overtures to some
aspects associated with mass‐party‐like organisation for
electoral mobilization, the party put little effort into actu‐
ally recruiting a large number of engaged party mem‐
bers or fostering their social rootedness. Concurrently,
while the party tried to enact an image of leadership
renewal, its everyday organisational practice continued
to revolve around strongly centralized, hierarchical struc‐
tures and, in particular, an absolutist leadership style
of the party’s long‐time leader. The findings provide a
relevant contribution to assessing the variety and func‐
tions of mass‐party‐related features within the com‐
parative study of PRR party organisation. Most espe‐
cially, our results invite further research on still rela‐
tively underexplored aspects in this research field: the
relationship between PRR organisations and mediatisa‐
tion of politics (Art, 2018), and most particularly on
the interactions between PRR organisation and active
party communication.
2. The Law and Justice Party and Populist Radical
Right Politics
Since its foundation by Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński in
2001, PiS has swiftly developed into an electorally rele‐
vant and strongly institutionalized party (Figure 1). From
the onset of the political activity of the Kaczyński broth‐
ers, their political projects have involved an anti‐liberal
and anti‐establishment anger which challenged the legit‐
imacy of the post‐1989 Polish transformation (Stanley,
2016). With time, PiS also developed its ability to flexi‐
bly adapt and successively monopolize the political offer
of its different populist and radical right competitors
(Pytlas, 2015).
A brief look at the history of PiS allows us to trace
its programmatic development and how it internalized
PRR politics (cf. in detail Pytlas, in press). The first party
founded by Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński in 1990, the
Centre Agreement (Porozumienie Centrum [PC]) under‐
scored legalism, tradition, as well as the importance
of the Catholic Church and Catholic Social Teaching. In
1992 the PC‐backed, conservative minority government
lost a vote of no‐confidence which led to the advent of
a right‐wing, anti‐establishment conspiracy theory. This
myth claimed that “communist‐liberal pacts” worked to
“steal the transition,” and PiS has subsequently internal‐
ized this narrative (cf. Pytlas, 2015). PiS itself emerged
in 2001 after the collapse of the incumbent centre‐
right electoral coalition. The party’s name reflected
the popular agenda of Lech Kaczyński, who served as
Justice Minister 2000–2001. PiS accordingly expanded
PC’s social‐conservative platformwith an increased focus
on law and order, and anti‐corruption issues.
Already four years after its creation, PiS won
the Polish parliamentary election with 27% of the
vote. PiS formed its first government, led by Jarosław
Kaczyński, with the PRR League of Polish Families (Liga
Polskich Rodzin [LPR]) and the agrarian‐populist Self‐
Defence of the Republic of Poland party (Samoobrona
Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej; Stanley, 2016). At least since
that time, PiS has increasingly expanded its social‐
conservative stances with core PRR elements. These
include populist appeals to a monist general will of
the “pure people” directed against a “corrupt elite,”
as well as nativist narratives centred on defending a
homogenous “nation” allegedly threatened by socio‐
cultural “othered” (Mudde, 2007). PiS combined nar‐
ratives of its coalition partners into an overarching,
anti‐liberal project of a “Fourth Republic,” creating a
single divide between “liberal’’ and “social‐solidaristic”
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Figure 1. PiS results in national and voivodship‐level parliamentary elections. Source: National Electoral Commission
(2021).
Poland (Szczerbiak, 2007). Most notably, it adapted the
LPR’s nativist claims regarding the alleged threats to
“Polish Catholic values” and national identity coming
from left‐wing and liberal parties, their ideas and sup‐
porters, as well as from LGBTIQ persons (Pytlas, 2015).
As a result of internal power struggles, the govern‐
ment fell in 2007. PiS was succeeded in power by its arch‐
rival, the liberal‐conservative Civic Platform (Platforma
Obywatelska [PO]). Since the PiS leader, Lech Kaczyński,
became Warsaw President in 2002 and Polish President
in 2005, the party’s affairs have increasingly become the
domain of his brother Jarosław. PiS’s anti‐establishment
conspiracy myths reignited after a 2010 plane accident
over Smolensk led to the tragic death of 96 passen‐
gers, including Lech Kaczyński and several top‐level pub‐
lic officials.
While PiS continuously delegitimized Polish politics,
after two consecutive failures to secure a governmental
majority the party adjusted its electoral tactics. During
the 2015 presidential and Sejm electoral campaigns, PiS
“hid” Jarosław Kaczyński, as his radicalism and authorita‐
tive leadership style were deemed hurtful to the party’s
appeal (Engler et al., 2019). The presidential electionwas
surprisingly won by the less well‐known PiS Member of
the European Parliament (MEP), Andrzej Duda. Duda tac‐
tically downplayed intra‐Polish socio‐cultural divisions
and promised a humble presidency, open to the con‐
cerns and active initiatives of citizens. Directed by Duda’s
campaign manager Beata Szydło, PiS repeated these
euphemising tactics during the subsequent parliamen‐
tary election. In addition to redistributive policies, PiS
promised to fundamentally fix Polish politics by bring‐
ing about a “good change” towards new, efficacious, and
attentive political elites. These tactics allowed PiS to flexi‐
bly shape its image between a radical outsider and a con‐
ventional established party (cf. Pytlas, in press).
Immediately after the victorious 2015 election, PiS
returned to its radicalmode, aggrandising political power
to the detriment of democratic principles and constitu‐
tional norms. The party swiftly seized control over the
public media and captured main institutions of the inde‐
pendent judiciary (Pytlas, 2018; Sadurski, 2019). This has
nonetheless not halted the party’s repeated victories in
2019. At least since 2016, when confronting increased
competition from the elitist radical right Confederation
(Konfederacja) in 2016, PiS reactivated its nativist demo‐
nization of LGBTIQ persons (cf. “Kaczyński o patrio‐
tyzmie,” 2019; OSCE, 2020; Tilles, 2020). Since October
2020, the government has faced mass protests sparked
by the decision of the PiS‐captured Constitutional
Tribunal to further restrict pro‐choice rights, leading to
their de facto ban (Walker, 2020). Jarosław Kaczyński
characterized civic protests as an attack by evil forces on
the Polish “nation” (cf. Onet Wiadomosci, 2020). Thus,
already shortly after its successful 2015 electoral cam‐
paign, PiS has further consolidated its anti‐liberalism
around core radical right ideology.
3. Did the Law and Justice Party Pursue a
Mass‐Party‐Type Organisation?
Having introduced the party’s electoral and ideological
development, we begin the main analysis by assessing
whether PiS attempted to develop a mass‐party‐style
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 4, Pages 340–353 342
organisation.We follow Albertazzi and van Kessel (2021),
focusing first on the party’s organisational complexity, as
well as how (if at all) PiS tried to attract active members
and supporters while also facilitating their social rooted‐
ness within the party.
3.1. Organisational Complexity
PiS swiftly developed a complex party structure. PiS’s
statute names the Committee as the basic organisational
party unit (PiS, 2016). Local party branches are man‐
aged by District Boards (zarząd okręgowy). The boards
are distributed in correspondence to the constituency
structure for parliamentary elections. Since 2012, PiS
structures also include 16 Regional Councils (rada region‐
alna) which manage the party’s activities at the highest
administrative level of a voivodship (województwo) and
coordinate the activities of lower‐level bodies. Regarding
local organisational strength, PiS did not differ much
from other established parties in Poland (Figure 2).
Nevertheless, PiS’s local organisation has been more
extensive compared to all Polish political parties—many
of them including anti‐establishment newcomers.
Furthermore, PiS developed a formally complex inter‐
nal party structure (Figure 3). In central office, the PiS
statute names the Congress as the highest party author‐
ity (PiS, 2016). The Congress elects the Chairperson
(prezes) and decides on the party’s ideological princi‐
ples. The Chairperson is the highest executive author‐
ity of PiS. Among other executive and representative
functions, the Chair proposes candidates for parliamen‐
tary positions, coordinates socio‐political activities of
the party, and organises the work of the party in cen‐
tral office as well as the parliamentary group via its
chairpersons. According to PiS statute, it is the Political
Committee (komitet polityczny) led by the PiS Chair that
runs the everyday activities of the party, with regional
structures explicitly described as auxiliary to this goal
(PiS, 2016, p. 15). Amongmanagement tasks, the Political
Committee confirms the party’s candidates in elections
and elects further administrative bodies. Finally, the
Political Council (rada polityczna) is the highest legisla‐
tive authority of PiS and is directed by the Chairperson.
In addition to administrative functions, the Council devel‐
ops the party’s programmatic direction and elects sev‐
eral central bodies proposed by the PiS Chair, as well
as candidates in parliamentary, local, and presidential
elections. In addition to this complex formal structure,
Figure 3 illustrates that the PiS Chair has been granted
a key role in the party organisation already at the formal
level. As we will see below, the organisational practice of
the party turns out to be much simpler once we account
for the strongly leader‐based accountability mechanisms
and decision‐making processes, as well as the absolutist
leadership style of Jarosław Kaczyński, popularly dubbed
as The Prezes.
3.2. Law and Justice Party Membership in Context
Already in the early 2010s, Poland exemplified the
broader trend of party membership decline. Only under
1% of the electorate were members of a party, leaving
Poland to trail behind all Central and Eastern European
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Figure 2. Local organisational strength of PiS, PO, and all main Polish political parties 2001–2019. Source: V‐Party Dataset
(Lührmann et al., 2020)
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Figure 3. PiS Organigram. Source: Own composition, based on PiS (2016).
In 2018, the 83 registered Polish parties had a total of
241,600members—around 0.8%of the Polish electorate.
An average Polish party had around 4,100 members,
whilst half of Polish parties had no more than 300 mem‐
bers (GUS, 2020).
Observing self‐reported party membership devel‐
opment for major parties since 2011, we see that
the agrarian‐conservative Polish People’s Party (Polskie
Stronnictwo Ludowe [PSL]) continues to have the
strongest member base (cf. Figure 4). PO’s member‐
ship, on the other hand, peaked in 2011 with 50,234
members, but dropped to around 32,000 in 2020, a
development observed also with the social‐democratic
Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej
[SLD]). Conversely, PiS was able to double its mem‐
bership since 2011, declaring around 40,000 members
in 2020.
Overall, we need to be mindful of the (in)accuracy
inherent to self‐reported membership data, and it is
important to place the figures in context. While PiS
membership clearly increased since 2015, membership
fees in 2019 still constituted only around 1.3% of the
party’s revenue. Ninety‐six percent of PiS’s income came
from credits (around 50%) and state subsidies (around
46%; cf. PKW, 2019). Concurrently, organisational density
(members/voters’ ratio) of PO fell from 0.0089 in 2011
to 0.0063 in 2019; for PiS, it remained stable with 0.0049
and 0.005, respectively. Thus, since 2015 PiS caught up
with its arch‐rival in absolute terms. Yet despite the
downward trend, PO still had a higher share of members
relative to its electorate when compared to PiS.
3.3. Campaign Mobilization of Engaged
Sympathisers—But No Efforts to Attract and
Socialize Members
Regarding mobilization practices, major Polish parties
have primarily emphasized political marketing and
mediatized campaigning. Nonetheless, this focus did
not replace organisational development. Major Polish
parties—including PiS—swiftly developed electoral‐
professional organisations (Farrell & Webb, 2000;
Panebianco, 1988) as the centre of strategic campaign
efforts (cf. Mazur, 2011; Sula, 2008). Increasingly spe‐
cialized party‐affiliated staff and central offices thus play
a decisive role in shaping the political “product” pro‐
moted in coordination with external campaign agencies
and political consultants (cf. Biskup, 2011). To be sure,
parties also did not relinquish face‐to‐face campaigning,
such as organising public rallies and meetings with party
figureheads. Yet, the campaign expenses of PiS and other
major parties have become increasingly dominated by
mass media communication, most notably television ads
(Mazur, 2011).
After 2011, PiS began professionalizing its social
media activity and dynamically campaigned on several
channels, most notably Facebook and Instagram. Under
growing competitive pressure from newly emerging
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Figure 4. Self‐reported membership numbers of PiS, PO, SLD, and PSL. Source: “Przybywa członków PiS” (2020), van Haute
& Paulis (2016).
anti‐establishment actors, PiS’s electoral campaign of
2015 tactically increased appeals to rebuilding repre‐
sentative party linkages. On the one hand, the afore‐
mentioned vision of “good change” invoked a passive
notion of mass‐party‐like linkages, promising to close
representational gaps by a caring elite attentive to the
concerns of “the citizens.” On the other hand, the
party’s new candidates constructed an image of PiS as
an organisationally reinvigorated and united “team of
good change” (wPolityce.pl, 2015). Yet PiS also appealed
to more active mass‐party‐related linkages. For example,
the video ad #wecandothis (#damyrade) mobilized sym‐
pathizers to actively participate in the PiS campaign by
sharing and discussing the party’s programmatic argu‐
ments on social media, but also by engaging in per‐
sonal conversations and canvassing (PiS, 2015). During
the 2019 election, PiS launched a campaign titled Join
the Team of Good Change. Its actual goal was nonethe‐
less not to attract activists, but rather to advertise an
SMS‐messaging newsletter where subscribers could be
informed about the party’s campaign activities (“PiS
uruchamia system,’’ 2019).
Overall, since 2015 PiS’s electoral rhetoric increas‐
ingly suggested that political change depends on hard
work and active engagement of the party’s sympathiz‐
ers, thus creating amobilizing image of a united effort by
party elites and supporters. Yet it seems that since 2014
the activity of PiS voters did not substantively increase
(see Figure 5). The share of self‐declared PiS voters who
contacted politicians, engaged in party work, or openly
expressed campaign support, remained comparatively
low. It was also lower than the average share of active
voters for othermajor parties (cf. European Social Survey,
2018, rounds 7–9).
Furthermore, while PiS made rhetorical appeals to
strengthen both active and passive mass‐party‐related
linkages, evidence suggests that the party was reluc‐
tant to actually engage in attracting a large number
of active members. In the wake of the Smolensk acci‐
dent, a well‐known right‐wing publicist complained that
local PiS officials resisted admitting the activated sup‐
porters of PiS‐adjacent civic organisations into the party
(Ziemkiewicz, 2011, as cited in Nyzio, 2014, p. 213).
After the party’s return to power in 2015, PiS did not
relax its relatively restrictive criteria for party admis‐
sion. To become a PiS member, the candidate needs to
provide a recommendation from at least two current
party members already prior to submitting the appli‐
cation (cf. PiS, 2016; “Przybywa członków PiS,” 2020).
PiS also did not launch a visible public campaign aimed
at broadening its rank‐and‐file. On the contrary, state‐
ments by party officials instead suggest a reserved stance
to expanding the membership base. Commenting on
the party’s recent membership growth, the Chair of
PiS Executive Committee noted that the party does not
accept all membership applications and added “if this
was the case, we would have 15–20 thousand members
more” (cf. “Przybywa członków PiS,” 2020, translation by
the author).
Analysing different sources, including secondary lit‐
erature, local press reports, as well as party websites
and social media communication channels, we have
also found no evidence of substantial efforts by PiS
to socialize and integrate their rank‐and‐file members
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Figure 5. Activity of PiS electorate. Source: European Social Survey (2018, rounds 7–9).
more deeply into the party beyond electoral campaigns.
Studies which survey party activists suggest that PiS
members indeed had considerable mass‐party‐related
expectations regarding their potential party activity, but
these were not prioritized by the party organisation.
Surveyed PiS members most frequently expected the
party to foster a collective feeling of belonging, as well
as to engage members in social activities and exchange
(31% of all responses; Wincławska, 2020). The activities
which PiS members named as actually performing within
PiS included participation in party demonstrations and
meetings with officials (32.8%), as well as instrumental
tasks, such as signature collection or payingmembership
fees (40.1%;Wincławska, 2020). Interviewed PiS officials
themselves perceived the role of membership mainly
in instrumental terms and admitted that the party has
fewer ideas about how to engage rank‐and‐file members
beyond periods of electoral campaigning (Pacześniak &
Wincławska, 2017). Thus, despite PiS’s electoral cam‐
paign calls for sympathizers to engage with the party,
actual efforts made by the party to foster the intra‐party
social rootedness of its members seem to have been
largely absent.
3.4. Why Didn’t the Law and Justice Party Actually
Pursue Mass‐Party Organisation?
What are the possible reasons behind PiS’s reluctance to
actually grow a large activist membership base? In gen‐
eral, party leaders need to consider trade‐offs between
their particular interests and a more sustainable devel‐
opment of their organisation (Bolleyer, 2013; Heinisch
& Mazzoleni, 2016). Here, it is important to account for
the temporal aspect behind contingent choices by party
officials on how to achieve their personal or policy goals,
such as prioritizing short‐term strategies shaped by elec‐
toral cycles or more long‐term, and possibly uncertain
investment in collective party building (cf. Bolleyer, 2013;
Goetz, 2014).
On the one hand, in the case of an institutional‐
ized, leadership‐oriented party such as PiS, expanding its
active membership base might have been viewed as sec‐
ondary to short‐term priorities such as vote maximiza‐
tion and office‐seeking. These goals usually come with a
trade‐off between responsiveness to core supporters and
strategic adjustments to the broader, potential electorate
(Giger & Schumacher, 2020; Kitschelt & McGann, 1995;
Schumacher & Giger, 2018). To be sure, this rule is not
automatic. Northern League (Lega Nord) in Italy which
combined vote‐maximizing office ambitions with active
member integration is just one example (Albertazzi, 2016;
Heinisch & Mazzoleni, 2016). Nonetheless, building and
sustaining a large, engaged membership costs time and
can be perceived by party officials as disadvantageous for
their ability to manage the party.
On the other hand, it is vital to note that organisa‐
tional choicesmight also be related to various power con‐
flicts within and across different levels of party hierarchy
(cf. Bolleyer, 2012). Particularly in organisations shaped
around multi‐level patronal dependencies, not only cen‐
tral, but also regional mid‐level leaders might fear that
the uncontrolled entry of engagedmembers could shake
up existing power structures and create potential risks
for their own intra‐party influence.
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First, organisational considerations might thus
revolve aroundperceived trade‐offs between central and
regional leader‐oriented loyalty. From the point of view
of central leaders, sustaining an engaged base of active
members requires both distributing more resources and
delegating more powers to local branches. While institu‐
tional routinization itself does not have to be problem‐
atic for strongly centralized parties, related “value infu‐
sion” which could potentially lead to a stronger transfer
of loyalty from leaders to the party organisation itself
might be perceived by the central leadership as a bigger
challenge (Bolleyer, 2013). The central office may thus
oppose a mass‐party approach due to concerns over
the diversification of power networks and the increased
relevance of regional charters. Second, it is important
to account for the crucial role of mid‐level elites which
might also not be willing to jeopardize their own intra‐
party influence at the regional level. For local officials,
new highly engaged members can represent a source
of competition in terms of regional power and position
within the party hierarchy.
Comprehensive data on party elite attitudes regard‐
ing their organisations and party membership is gen‐
erally scarce. Yet studies conducting deep interviews
with Polish party officials and members lend empiri‐
cal plausibility to some of the above assumptions. One
PiS official commented: “In my private opinion, 30–35
thousand members is a kind of an optimal state, one
which one is able to handle considering financial and
human engagement” (Wincławska, 2020, p. 128, transla‐
tion by the author). Another PiS member noted: “Local
branches of Law and Justice do not really want new
members, being convinced that this will destabilize some
kind of current relations ….That new, more active, intel‐
lectually fitter people will come who feel like doing
more” (Wincławska, 2020, p. 128, translation by the
author). This further suggests that the party—including
its regional mid‐level elites—saw little merit in recruit‐
ing a large engaged member base. Additionally, this first
evidence also supports the argument that PiS officials
perceived such organisational approach as potentially
problematic for effectively running the party and espe‐
cially as a challenge to existing intra‐party power rela‐
tions and hierarchies.
4. Power Centralization and Internal Democracy
4.1. Centralization
While PiS is not the only strongly centralized Polish
party, it stands out regarding its strongly leader‐oriented
character (cf. Pacześniak & Wincławska, 2018; Tomczak,
2015; Uziębło, 2016). For example, unlike other parties
such as SLD, PO and the new left party Together (Razem),
PiS’s regional charters lack the freedom todecide on local
coalitions (Uziębło, 2016). Overall, on a scale of leader‐
ship strength related to selection procedures and pre‐
rogatives, as well as the role of party Chair in legisla‐
tive candidate selection and in parliament, PiS obtained
a score of 24 of possible 28 points, with a large lead
over the second‐placed PO with 10 points (Pacześniak &
Wincławska, 2018). With his leadership tenure reaching
18 years in 2021, Jarosław Kaczyński is the longest con‐
secutively acting party leader in Poland. PiS was the only
Polish party in which the last four leadership elections
took place without even a pro forma counter‐candidate
(cf. Pacześniak & Wincławska, 2018).
Returning to Figure 3, we see that the PiS leader
has wide‐ranging, formal prerogatives within the party.
The leader derives his strength especially from the vast
personalized possibilities to control, veto, and sanction
members and activists. The Chair can personally suspend
a partymember based on a reasonable presumption that
the member harmed PiS’s interests, even prior to tak‐
ing the case to the Party Disciplinary Court (PiS, 2016,
p. 6). PiS’s leader also has de facto control over candi‐
date nomination in parliamentary elections. Even though
candidate lists are officially confirmed by the Political
Committee, it is the PiS Chair who has the personal pre‐
rogative to present the final candidate lists for approval.
According to expert assessments, since 2011 Jarosław
Kaczyński has increased his control over candidate nom‐
ination procedures (Figure 6).
In addition to formal prerogatives, the leader’s posi‐
tion is thus further strengthened by de facto control
over the party’s daily executive and legislative activities.
The PiS Chair presides both over the Political Council and
the Political Committee. Thus, few key decisions in the
party can be made without the knowledge and consent
of the PiS Chair. Interestingly, in “urgent matters” the
PiS leader can single‐handedly make a decision pertain‐
ing to the Committee’s competences, subject to valida‐
tion at the subsequent session (PiS, 2016; cf. Tomczak,
2015). The fact that it is the Committee that formally
runs the everyday activities of the party gives the PiS
Chair personal control over party branches. The PiS Chair,
via the Committee, thus has the prerogative to nomi‐
nate and dismiss local party leadership, as well as to
create, suspend, or disband regional PiS structures as
a whole.
4.2. Intra‐Party Democracy
While the PiS Chair already enjoys strong formal pow‐
ers, the key feature of PiS’s organisational practice lies
in the highly patronal and absolutist leadership style
of Jarosław Kaczyński. In the past, the Chair did not
hesitate to make use of his sanctioning tools, either
directly or via the Political Committee. A regular dis‐
ciplinary tool is the suspension of members and par‐
liamentarians who have fallen out of favour with the
leadership. Around 2010–2011, when the party entered
an internal crisis, several officials increasingly criticized
the leadership style of Jarosław Kaczyński. In 2011, the
Political Committee disbanded the party’s local organ‐
isations in the constituencies of regional officials or




























Figure 6.Decision‐making power over candidate nomination in legislative elections in PiS, PO, and all Polish parties. Source:
V‐Party Dataset (Lührmann et al., 2020).
MEPs who had criticized Kaczyński. Conflicts emerged
particularly between Jarosław Kaczyński and his former
Justice Minister, Zbigniew Ziobro. In 2011, Ziobro—then
PiS deputy Chair and MEP—called for the party’s “mod‐
ernisation” and “bottom‐up democratization, but with‐
out too much exaggeration” (“Wołanie o demokrację,”
2011). Ziobro’s challenge was echoed by the critique of
Kaczyński’s absolutist rule by other prominent PiS MEPs,
most notably Jacek Kurski and Tadeusz Cymański. In reac‐
tion, PiS’s Political Committee expelled all three officials
from the party. Ziobro went on to form a fringe splinter‐
party, United Poland (Solidarna Polska), and returned as
Justice Minister in the 2015 PiS‐led government. After
2015, the formally non‐partisan Kurski was entrusted
with presiding over Polish public TV, soon turned into a
PiS mouthpiece.
While Jarosław Kaczyński tightened his grip on PiS,
his radical image and absolutist leadership style did
not fit the party’s aforementioned new electoral tac‐
tics. In 2015, he re‐emerged only late in the campaign
to mobilize core supporters, and subsequently did not
assume any senior office. Until 2020, Kaczyński formally
remained a “mere rank‐and‐file” PiS member of parlia‐
ment. It is from this back seat position that he nonethe‐
less continued to exert personal control over not only
parliamentary, but also governmental, PiS activities.
Formally, it is the PiS Chair who directs the activities
of the party’s parliamentary group via its chairpersons
(PiS, 2016). This means that the official of the party in
central office has key decision‐making power over the
party’s parliamentary representation even if not person‐
ally elected to the Sejm. Jarosław Kaczyński’s guise as
an “ordinary member of parliament” ensured that he
was able to control the party’s activities without fac‐
ing direct accountability for the government’s actions.
Independent media reports have nonetheless regularly
highlighted his decision‐making role, not only within
the parliamentary group, but also within the govern‐
ment. Kaczyński enjoyed more privileges than an ordi‐
nary “rank‐and‐file” member of parliament. For exam‐
ple, he entered the lectern and told the PiS Sejm speaker
that hewouldmake a statement without considering the
Parliament’s debate regulations. The PiS Chair—without
holding any position in the executive—has, on occasions,
personally announced government bills to quell scandals
which had gained enough public visibility to pose a lia‐
bility to the party. In 2019, media furthermore reported
on regular meetings between Jarosław Kaczyński, Prime
Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, and the president of the
PiS‐captured Constitutional Tribunal, Julia Przyłębska, at
the latter’s private home during PiS’s attempts to gain
control over the Supreme Court and the National Council
of Judiciary (cf. Wroński & Kondzińska, 2019).
In 2020, internal power struggles, problems with the
management of the Covid‐19 public health crisis, and
failure to contain mass anti‐government civic protests,
cumulated in a party and coalition crisis. Kaczyński
entered the PiS government to “stabilize” the coalition
as a deputy prime minister without a portfolio, responsi‐
ble for public security. The Prezes suspended 15 PiS par‐
liamentarians who voted against his favoured bill on ani‐
mal rights protection, depicted as the alleged main rea‐
son behind the coalition crisis. In 2020, party officials
began—mostly anonymously—to voice their irritation
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with the leadership’s chaotic actions, unclear tactical
direction, and attempts to intimidate dissenting voices
(cf. Dziubka, 2020).
Given this absolutist leadership style as well as the
general hierarchical and patronal organisation, intra‐
party democracywithin PiSwas thus almost non‐existent.
Similarly to other Polish parties, the PiS statute gives
party members active and passive voting rights, the right
to participate in PiS activities and to propose political
or organisational initiatives to party bodies, as well as
to seek party protection from any “repressive actions”
related to being a party member (PiS, 2016, p. 7). Unlike
in othermajor parties, such as SLD andPO, the PiS statute
nonetheless does not grant individualmembers even the
formal power to directly shape the party’s programme or
direction. Direct bottom‐up decision‐making is generally
uncommon in Polish political parties, but several have
nonetheless introduced singular direct democraticmech‐
anisms. For example, the PO has inclusive procedures
of candidate nomination for public office; the PO, SLD,
and Razem give members the right to select the party
leadership; and both the SLD and Razem allow inter‐
nal referendums before taking important party decisions
(Wincławska et al., 2021). While the referendum initia‐
tive used by the SLD applies only to the central office, the
statute of Razem foresees the possibility of a referendum
initiated from the bottom‐up by members or local party
boards (Uziębło, 2016).
Summing up, rank‐and‐file members and PiS officials
outside of central office had little practical influence on
the party’s decision‐making and programmatic direction.
PiS stood out in this regard significantly, even when com‐
pared to other centralized Polish political parties (see
Figure 7). Again, a considerable share of PiS members
hoped to have the opportunity to contribute by influ‐
encing the party’s programmatic course or running in
elections (25.4% of responses). Yet fulfilling meritocratic
tasks amounted only to 17.1% of responses to the ques‐
tion which activities PiS members actually pursue within
the party—and the tasks mentioned were still predom‐
inantly restricted to running in elections (Wincławska,
2020). Even though in 2015 the campaign rhetoric of PiS
signalled a turn towards openness to civic policy initia‐
tives, within the party itself those activists who wanted
toparticipate in shaping theparty’s programmatic course
remained sealed off from the party’s hermetic, central‐
ized organisation.
5. Conclusions
This article analysed the organisational development
of PiS in Poland. The framework by Albertazzi and
van Kessel (2021) allowed us to observe PiS’s efforts to
develop a mass‐party‐related organisation, as well as
to explore the extent to which the party has central‐
ized its intra‐party decision‐making procedures. The case
of institutionalized incumbent PiS contributes not only
to observing the organisational variety and dynamics
in parties using PRR politics. Most notably, analysing a
party which flexibly operated between radical and con‐
ventional politics shows that it is important to account
for what parties using PRR politics might declare versus
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Figure 7. Policy decision‐making power of leadership vs. members in Poland 2019. Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2019
(Bakker et al., 2020).
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Particularly during the 2015 presidential and parlia‐
mentary elections, PiS attempted to simulate not only
programmatic but also organisational renewal. The cam‐
paigns highlighted that fundamentally “fixing” politics
is only possible by a united effort of both “new” effi‐
cacious party elites and engagement of (non‐member)
sympathizers. This shows that political actors may try
to increase their potential mobilization appeal also by
enacting their organisational reinvigoration, such as a
supposed move away from more broadly stigmatized
leaders, or a shift towards stronger mass‐party‐type link‐
ages with engaged supporters.
Nonetheless, while PiS enacted mass‐party‐linkages
tomobilise sympathisers especially during electoral cam‐
paigns, it did not actually pursue to develop a mass‐
party organisation. While between 2015 and 2019 PiS
reported to have doubled its membership numbers, it
did not actively engage in actually expanding its mem‐
ber base. Most notably, PiS branches also did not seem
to put effort into fostering opportunities for its rank‐and‐
file to develop a feeling of collective belonging and grass‐
roots socialization through everyday intra‐party activi‐
ties. Surveyed PiS officials justified their reluctance to
admit new members by citing issues related to party
management. Local officials also feared that new, highly
engaged members, would destabilize intra‐party rela‐
tions and increase competition over influence within
the party (Wincławska, 2020). These insights invite fur‐
ther research into intra‐elite conflict and contingent,
organisation‐related choices by party officials—not only
central leadership, but also mid‐level elites across and
within different (sub‐)national party levels.
Despite its performative reorganisation, PiS has also
remained a strongly centralized party built around
patronal networks and the power of its long‐time leader.
While PiS developed a complex and widespread organi‐
sation, the actual structure of decision‐making relations
within PiS remained much simpler and orbited around
the party’s Chair, JarosławKaczyński. The continued dom‐
inance of Kaczyński over the party was sustained by his
absolutist leadership style. The Prezes did not hesitate
to deploy his vast prerogatives—whether personally or
via central office bodies—to control, veto, and sanction
party officials and local structures in practice. Regarding
power centralization and instruments used to keep the
leader in power despite stronger party institutionaliza‐
tion, PiS therefore did not differ in substance from most
PRR parties in Western Europe (cf. Heinisch &Mazzoleni,
2016). Concurrently, the specific tactic of running the
party from the back seat allowed Kaczyński, aided by
PiS‐loyal media, to present himself as a symbolic saviour
of Polish politics—if necessary, even from the malaise
of his own party organisation. On the record, PiS offi‐
cials pledged allegiance to the party leader, underscor‐
ing his wisdom, skills, and charisma (cf. Pacześniak &
Wincławska, 2018). Yet obedience to Kaczyński seems
to have rested not primarily in charismatic traits, but
rather in his tight grip over party members and struc‐
tures, as well as his use of sanctions to tame internal
dissent. The potential for intra‐party intrigue thus contin‐
ued to simmer beneath the surface of a seemingly coher‐
ent organisation.
Our findings have important broader implications.
Most notably, they invite further studies on the still rel‐
atively underexplored aspect of research on the radical
right: the relationship between PRR party organisation
and the mediatisation of politics (Art, 2018). Specifically,
our analysis demonstrates that it is useful to comple‐
ment crucial research advances on how external media
outlets react to the PRR (de Jonge, 2021; Ellinas, 2009,
2014) with a perspective on how parties in general, and
PRR parties in particular, actively communicate about
and perform organisation. Concurrently, the case of PiS
demonstrates that it is analytically relevant to disentan‐
gle and contrast what parties might rhetorically declare
to what they actually do in terms of their organisa‐
tional features. This implies the need to account for the
ways communication and organisation constantly inter‐
act, rather than observing them just as a zero‐sum game
(Art, 2018).
Accordingly, our findings suggest that parties might
try to actively navigate potential trade‐offs between dif‐
ferent organisational features and associated priorities,
such as short‐term office‐seeking. Performative organi‐
sational “rebranding” facilitated PiS’s ability to include
selected mass‐party appeals into their campaign while
minimizing time‐intensive organisational costs and per‐
ceived risks to internal power hierarchies. At the same
time, it allowed the party to blur its organisational pro‐
file. This has additionally helped PiS enact an image of
a renewed challenger distinct from “politics as usual,”
without impeding the party’s primary vote‐maximizing
strategy. These first insights invite further comparative
research into the diverse ways by which parties try to
de‐demonize and broaden the appeal of their leader‐
ship and organisations without necessarily shifting their
positions—an aspect particularly relevant to the analy‐
sis of the radical right (Akkerman et al., 2016). Future
studies should also explore the impact of communica‐
tive strategies on political conflicts and party organisa‐
tion itself.
The organisational development of PiS in Poland
remains an important, but also a highly dynamic case.
Fierce personal conflicts within PiS re‐emerged anew
since 2020 amidst the Covid‐19 public health crisis and
confrontation with anti‐government protests. The most
recent Congress, postponed to 3 July 2021 due to
the pandemic, confirmed Jarosław Kaczyński as party
leader, and he declared that this would be his last
term in office. Simultaneously, the party signalled first
steps towards reorganising its regional operations. In
its core, the planned reform will prohibit officials with
duties in public office from also serving as district
chairs. Instead, the primary task of new district leaders
would be to manage their regional branch. At first sight,
this could suggest that PiS might be moving towards
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strengthening bureaucratic ties between mid‐level offi‐
cials and ordinary members. In this vein, PiS central
leadership has justified its reform plans by citing the
need to end inertia caused by the inactivity of local
party “barons” (baronizacja) and public officials who
lack the time to adequately attend to their local organ‐
isations (Wróblewski, 2020). Still, given that the new
officials would be directly remunerated by the central
office, this reformmight further cement the weak auton‐
omy of local branches. Furthermore, given increased
direct dependency on central office (qua the function of
secretary general), hierarchical power conflicts are not
unlikely to further impede developing a larger, socialized
member basis. Party officials indeed expressed concerns
about potential intra‐party conflicts between new and
oldmid‐level elites, suggesting that the planned reform is
primarily aimed at strengthening the regional influence
of officials loyal to the current Prime Minister Mateusz
Morawiecki (Wróblewski, 2020), one of potential heirs
to JarosławKaczyński. It will be relevant to observewhich
trajectory the partymight take in the future, also once its
founding leader decides to pass the torch to a successor.
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